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INTRODUCTION 
Several months before the 2012 presidential election, a Time mag-
azine cover featured the faces of twenty Latinos1 and boldly pro-
claimed that Latinos would “pick the next President.”2  In big white 
lettering, the cover read, “Yo Decido” (I Decide).3  After President 
Barack Obama’s reelection, discussion about the Latino vote re-
mained at the center of a national dialogue.  Headlines reported that 
Latinos had turned out in record numbers and had significantly in-
creased their share of the total voters.4  Commentators warned that 
the losing Republican Party could no longer afford to ignore or al-
ienate Hispanics in national races and must instead pay greater atten-
tion to the interests of Latino communities.5  An official at the Na-
tional Council of La Raza, a Hispanic organization involved in 
registration campaigns, powerfully said, “Latino voters confirmed un-
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 1 This Comment uses the terms “Latino” and “Hispanic” interchangeably. 
  2 TIME, Mar. 5, 2012. 
 3 Id. 
 4 See, e.g., Julia Preston & Fernanda Santos, A Record Latino Turnout, Solidly Backing Obama, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2012, at P13; Donna St. George & Brady Dennis, Growing Share of His-
panic Voters Helped Push Obama to Victory, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2012, available at 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-07/politics/35505702_1_hispanic-voters-
latino-votes-latino-decisions; MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW HISPANIC CTR., PEW 
RESEARCH CTR., LATINO VOTERS IN THE 2012 ELECTION 4–5 (2012), http://www.
pewhispanic.org/2012/11/07/latino-voters-in-the-2012-election (reporting that Latinos 
made up ten percent of the electorate, up from nine percent in 2008, and were a growing 
share of voters in key battleground states of the 2012 election). 
 5 Preston & Santos, supra note 4, at P13 (discussing how Latino leaders believe that Mitt 
Romney’s weak showing exemplifies why Hispanics can no longer be ignored during na-
tional campaigns). 
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equivocally that the road to the White House passes through Latino 
neighborhoods.”6  It looked to be the “Year of the Latino.” 
Despite Latinos’ growing political influence, however, discrimina-
tion against Latinos persists.  In 2011, an Associated Press poll found 
that fifty-seven percent of non-Hispanic whites harbored anti-
Hispanic sentiment,7 and a poll conducted by the Pew Research Cen-
ter found that sixty-one percent of Latinos believed discrimination 
against Hispanics to be a “major problem.”8  The Pew Research Cen-
ter also reported in 2010 that, when asked which of the various racial 
and ethnic groups were frequently the targets of discrimination, 
Americans answered Hispanics more often than any other group.9 
W.E.B. DuBois wrote in 1903, “The problem of the Twentieth 
Century is the problem of the color line . . . .”10  Today, the color line 
has expanded beyond the white-black racial dichotomy, and Latinos 
stand at the forefront of our national discussion about race, politics, 
and society.  In this discussion and amid evidence of prejudice, a cen-
tral legal question arises:  Does the Supreme Court’s current analyti-
cal framework for the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
Clause11 adequately protect the Latino population from discriminato-
ry laws and state action?12  This Comment concludes that the Court’s 
case law about the suspect class status of Latinos is unclear and un-
likely to effectively protect Latinos from stigmatizing legislation.  This 
Comment will provide a new analytical framework that can guide the 
Court in bringing clarity to the issue and ultimately protect Latinos’ 
civil rights. 
 
 6 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 7 Sonya Ross & Jennifer Agiesta, Poll:  Majority Harbor Prejudice Against Blacks and Hispanics, 
NBC LATINO (Oct. 27, 2012, 3:38 PM), http://nbclatino.com/2012/10/27/poll-majority-
harbor-prejudice-against-blacks-and-hispanics. 
 8 PEW RESEARCH CTR., LATINOS PERCEPTION OF DISCRIMINATION (2010), http://www.
pewresearch.org/daily-number/latinos-perceptions-of-discrimination. 
 9 PEW RESEARCH CTR., DISCRIMINATION AGAINST HISPANICS (2010), http://www.
pewresearch.org/daily-number/discrimination-against-hispanics (reporting that twenty-
three percent of Americans say Hispanics are frequent targets of discrimination, com-
pared to only eighteen percent of Americans who say the same thing about African Amer-
icans). 
 10 W.E.B DUBOIS, SOULS OF BLACK FOLK, at xv (Dover Thrift Ed. 1994) (1903). 
 11 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No state shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 12 Technically, equal protection applies to the federal government through judicial inter-
pretation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local gov-
ernments through the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 
(1954) (“We hold that racial segregation in the public schools of the District of Columbia 
is a denial of the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion.”). 
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Part I begins by briefly examining the development of heightened 
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause for laws that discriminate 
based on racial and national origin classifications.  Part I finds that 
the classification of Latinos as a “suspect group” meriting such scruti-
ny in fact rests on uncertain legal ground due to the Court’s confus-
ing case law, aggravating historical factors, and current demographic 
patterns.  It reveals that while the legal conclusions remain muddled 
about whether Latinos are a suspect class, the public perception of 
Latinos as a distinct population group has grown.  This Part also ex-
plains why the application of heightened scrutiny to classifications of 
various national origin groups, like Mexican Americans or Cuban 
Americans, is insufficient to adequately protect the civil rights of La-
tinos as a broader population group.  Part I thus advocates that the 
Court solidify the constitutional status of the broader Latino classifi-
cation as a suspect class. 
Part II examines how the Court, when determining which racial 
and ethnic categorizations merit suspect class analysis, often describes 
race as a purely biological concept.  Part II argues, however, that race 
is not a biological concept, but is instead a social concept.  It asserts 
that if the biological conception of race continues to prevail in sus-
pect class determinations, then it is unlikely that Latinos, an incredi-
bly diverse population, will fit within a coherent racial classification.  
As a result, the constitutional status of the Latino classification will 
remain in jeopardy.  Part II thus urges the Court to embrace the sci-
entific and anthropological research showing that race is in fact a so-
cially constructed concept.  It maintains that the Court must analyze 
race in a new and sensible way that reflects its social, instead of bio-
logical, foundations.  A new framework will not only align the Court 
with modern science, but it will also subsequently better accommo-
date the Latino categorization. 
Part III introduces such a new analytical framework, relying on the 
work of anthropologist Edward Said in his seminal work Orientalism.13  
Said explains how the Western world developed an “us” versus “them” 
political dichotomy when conceptualizing the Middle East, resulting 
in the creation of the foreign and inferior “Other.”  Part III proposes 
that the Court borrow this “us” versus “them” framework to rework 
suspect class analysis to ask whether a group has become “otherized” 
by the dominant Anglo-American society to an extent that subse-
quently warrants suspect class analysis and heightened scrutiny.  By 
asking this new question, the Court will develop an analysis that 
 
 13 EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978). 
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properly foregoes a biological discussion, adequately acknowledges 
the social construction of race, and ultimately reflects the social and 
political reality of the way that discrimination operates in the United 
States.  This new “otherization” framework will also ensure that Lati-
nos, a population group often described as outsiders who do not 
speak English and who do not share American values, are sufficiently 
protected through the Equal Protection Clause.  Part III concludes by 
addressing questions and critiques about the framework’s implemen-
tation. 
I.  THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE LATINO CLASSIFICATION FOR SUSPECT 
CLASS ANALYSIS AND THE NEED FOR ITS CLARIFICATION 
A.  Introduction to Suspect Class Analysis 
The Court first articulated that it would apply heightened scrutiny 
to laws that discriminated against various racial or national origin 
groups in Korematsu v. United States,14 which infamously upheld the 
constitutionality of the relocation of Japanese Americans during 
World War II.15  The Court declared, 
[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial 
group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such re-
strictions are unconstitutional.  It is to say that courts must subject them 
to the most rigid scrutiny.  Pressing public necessity may sometimes justi-
fy the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.16 
In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,17 the Court 
identified a central reason why strict scrutiny is appropriate for racial 
and national origin classifications.  It explained that “prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, 
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political pro-
cesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,” and thus, a 
“more searching judicial inquiry” is needed.18 
It is now well-settled that racial and national origin classifications 
will be permitted under strict scrutiny only if the government can 
meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that the discrimination is 
necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose.19  The racial 
 
 14 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 15 Id. at 218–19. 
 16 Id. at 216. 
 17 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 18 Id. at 153 n.4. 
 19 See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273–74 (1986) (laying out the 
Court’s two-prong test for examining government preferences based on racial or ethnic 
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and national origin groups so singled out are considered “suspect 
classes,” and belonging to such a racial and/or national origin group 
constitutes an immutable characteristic.20  Applying strict scrutiny to 
racially discriminatory laws will be referred to simply as suspect class 
analysis in this Comment. 
B.  Problematic Case Law on Whether Latinos Constitute a Suspect Class 
The first Supreme Court case to apply suspect class analysis to a 
segment of the Latino population was Hernandez v. Texas.21  In this 
case, the Court unanimously reversed a Mexican American petition-
er’s murder conviction on equal protection grounds, finding a dis-
criminatory application of state law.22  Chief Justice Earl Warren, writ-
ing for the Court, found evidence that persons of Mexican descent 
were a separate class, distinct from whites, in Jackson County, Texas 
and found that there had been a systematic exclusion of members of 
this class from jury service.23  Instead of finding a per se suspect class 
classification, however, the Court explained that “[w]hether such a 
group exists within a community is a question of fact.”24  It cited tes-
timony by local Jackson County residents that the community distin-
guished between “white” and “Mexican,” evidence of mandated 
school segregation, the existence of a sign at a local restaurant read-
ing “No Mexicans Served,” and the existence of a sign above the 
men’s toilets in a local courthouse saying “Hombres Aqui” (“Men 
Here”).25 
 
criteria:  first, that any racial classification “must be justified by a compelling governmen-
tal interest” and second, that the “means chosen by the State to effectuate its purpose 
must be narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal” (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 20 See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (explaining that sex is an im-
mutable characteristic, like race and national origin, as it is a characteristic determined 
solely by the “accident of birth”). 
 21 347 U.S. 475 (1954). 
 22 Id. at 482 (“[Defendant’s] only claim is the right to be indicted and tried by juries from 
which all members of his class are not systematically excluded—juries selected from 
among all qualified persons regardless of national origin or descent.  To this much, he is 
entitled by the Constitution.”). 
 23 Id. at 480–82 (“Circumstances or chance may well dictate that no persons in a certain 
class will serve on a particular jury or during some particular period.  But it taxes our cre-
dulity to say that mere chance resulted in there being no members of this class among the 
over six thousand jurors called in the past 25 years.”). 
 24 Id. at 478. 
 25 Id. at 479–80 (highlighting the various fact-specific considerations that allowed the Court 
to determine that persons of Mexican descent constitute a class in Jackson County dis-
tinct from whites). 
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The Court’s holding was thus fact-specific and turned on the par-
ticular social stigmas and attitudes about the Mexican Americans in 
Jackson County.26  One scholar notes that “[w]hereas the Court had 
historically understood (and accepted without question) the protect-
ed status of African Americans in terms of race, in Hernandez the 
Court relied on the dynamics of variable ‘community prejudices’ to 
hold that under certain circumstances,” Mexican Americans could be 
a suspect class.27  It is also particularly noteworthy that this case was 
not described as a “race” case as neither the State of Texas nor the 
defendant argued that Mexican Americans were non-white for pur-
poses of the Equal Protection Clause.28  Thus, although Hernandez 
marks the first case in which the Court recognized that persons of 
Mexican descent constitute a suspect class, the case did not create a 
new per se racial classification under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
White v. Regester,29 a case decided twenty years after Hernandez, in-
volved an equal protection challenge by both Mexican Americans 
and blacks to a Texas legislative redistricting plan, and it shows the 
persistence of a fact-specific inquiry for Mexican Americans.30  The 
Court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Mexican Americans 
were a suspect class by reviewing the historic and present discrimina-
tory conditions of the Mexican American community in Bexar Coun-
ty.31  The black plaintiffs, however, were not required to make such a 
showing of local discrimination,32 as the Court bypassed an analysis 
about the specific social position of blacks in the districts in question.  
Although the Court once again struck down a law in order to protect 
Mexican Americans from discrimination, the status of this community 
for purposes of equal protection analysis continued to be “dependent 
on extrinsic attitudinal factors that require demonstration in each 
case.”33 
Hernandez was then apparently, yet problematically, extended in 
Keyes v. School District No. 1,34 which considered the segregation of 
 
 26 Jamie L. Crook, From Hernandez v. Texas to the Present:  Doctrinal Shifts in the Supreme 
Court’s Latina/o Jurisprudence, 11 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 19, 19–20 (2008). 
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 35 (explaining that although this case was brought under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, neither side argued that “Mexican Americans were non-white”). 
 29 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
 30 See id. at 765–69. 
 31 Id. at 767–69. 
 32 Richard Delgado & Vicky Palacios, Mexican Americans as a Legally Cognizable Class Under 
Rule 23 and the Equal Protection Clause, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 393, 396 (1975). 
 33 Id. 
 34 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
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Hispanic students in the Denver, Colorado school system.35  Justice 
William J. Brennan, Jr., writing for the Court, stated, “We have held 
that Hispanos constitute an identifiable class for purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”36  Despite its seeming definitiveness, this 
statement proves to be extremely problematic for two reasons.  First, 
the only Supreme Court precedent cited in support of this proposi-
tion was Hernandez.37  However, Hernandez’s case-by-case, fact-specific 
inquiry that proves central to its holding is unacknowledged in this 
brief citation.38  Second, Hernandez only discussed the social position 
of Mexican Americans, but in citing Hernandez, Keyes uses the ambig-
uous and potentially broader term of “Hispanos.”  Justice Brennan 
notes the ambiguity of the term in a footnote, writing, “‘Hispano’ is 
the term used by the Colorado Department of Education to refer to a 
person of Spanish, Mexican, or Cuban heritage. . . . In the Southwest, 
the ‘Hispanos’ are more commonly referred to as ‘Chicanos’ or ‘Mex-
ican-Americans.’”39  The Court used the more inclusive definition of 
“Hispanos,” as did the Colorado Department of Education, represent-
ing an unexplained broadening of Hernandez’s holding beyond a lo-
calized Mexican American community to include a generalized popu-
lation of Cubans, Spaniards, and possibly other ethnic groups.  Thus, 
as a scholar noted, the Court “afforded Hernandez v. Texas a stronger 
reading than that decision actually warranted.”40 
Keyes’s problematic reliance on Hernandez is further exemplified 
by the disagreement in the Eleventh Circuit about the meaning of 
Keyes.  In Valle v. Secretary for the Department of Corrections,41 involving 
habeas review, the circuit court discussed Keyes and denied a rehear-
ing en banc of a Florida Supreme Court case.42  The court had previ-
ously concluded that the term “Latin American” failed to represent a 
single cognizable class for equal protection analysis and that such a 
conclusion was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, 
 
 35 Id. at 191. 
 36 Id. at 197. 
 37 See id.  Five other cases were cited in support of the proposition, but all of these addition-
al cases were lower court decisions. 
 38 See Steven Harmon Wilson, Some Are Born White, Some Achieve Whiteness, and Some Have 
Whiteness Thrust upon Them:  Mexican Americans and the Politics of Racial Classification in the 
Federal Judicial Bureaucracy, Twenty-Five Years After Hernandez v. Texas, 25 CHICANO-
LATINO L. REV. 201, 202 (2005) (noting that Hernandez is often “cited but passed over 
quickly”). 
 39 Keyes, 413 U.S. at 195–96 n.6. 
 40 Crook, supra note 26, at 41. 
 41 478 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 42 Id. at 1326–27. 
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federal law as it stood in 1985, when the case was originally decided.43  
In denying the rehearing, a concurring judge commented that Keyes 
had not clearly established in 1973 that “Latin Americans were a con-
stitutionally cognizable group” because “each case the Supreme 
Court cited in support of its conclusion that Hispanos were an identi-
fiable class referred only to persons of Mexican descent.”44  A dissent-
ing judge disagreed, writing that the Supreme Court had legitimately 
chosen to use the broader term “Hispanos” instead of the limited 
term “Mexican American” in Keyes, thereby making “Latin Ameri-
cans” a cognizable class.45  Simply, Keyes remained suspect to the cir-
cuit. 
The Supreme Court has not clarified Keyes’s scope, as it has never 
cited the case to support a finding that any Latino population group 
constitutes a suspect class for equal protection purposes.  In addition, 
even in its continued citations to Hernandez, the Supreme Court re-
mains inconsistent.  While Castaneda v. Partida,46 Regents of the Universi-
ty of California v. Bakke,47 and B.P.O.E. Lodge No. 2043 of Brunswick v. 
Ingraham48 indicated that Hernandez’s holding applied to Mexican 
Americans, a parenthetical in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. curi-
ously suggested that Hernandez instead involved discrimination 
against a broader group of Hispanics.49  The puzzle about Hernandez 
and Keyes’s legacy remains. 
C.  Aggravating Factors That Complicate Conclusions About Latinos’ 
Constitutional Status 
These citation anomalies, however, are not the only factors that 
create a question about when Latino population groups should be 
found to constitute a suspect class under the Fourteenth Amendment 
and about which ethnic population groups should be included.  
Three other considerations also aggravate the confusion.  The first is 
a theoretical argument that because the “Civil War amendments were 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 1327 (Wilson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 45 Id. at 1329–30 (Barkett, J., dissenting).  Note that the judge did not find a difference be-
tween the terms “Hispanos” and “Latin Americans.” 
 46 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (“[I]t is no longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are 
a clearly identifiable class.”). 
 47 438 U.S. 265, 292 (1978) (indicating in a parenthetical that Hernandez involved Mexican 
Americans). 
 48 411 U.S. 924, 927 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (describing that Hernandez involved 
discrimination against persons of Mexican descent). 
 49 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (indicating in a parenthetical that Her-
nandez involved Hispanics more generally). 
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aimed at redressing injustices to blacks, principally slavery,” the Equal 
Protection Clause conceptualizes a “black-white” racial binary that 
becomes ill suited to protect other racial minority groups.50  Simply, 
the historical black-white paradigm does not incorporate the experi-
ences of Latinos and other minority groups.51  Courts thus have diffi-
culty using the Equal Protection Clause to redress discrimination 
against non-black minority groups when that discrimination takes a 
form that has not been traditionally experienced by blacks.52  This 
implication is particularly relevant for Latinos in the context of dis-
crimination based on their use of the Spanish language and their 
immigration status.  As Professor Angela Harris wrote, “[T]he as-
sumption that rights and especially remedies crafted for a biracial so-
ciety will fit a multiracial” society has become “increasingly problem-
atic” as the United States becomes a nation of many minorities, 
including Latinos, “rather than a nation of black and white.”53  Find-
ing Latinos to be a suspect class may require new judicial investiga-
tions and evaluations. 
A second consideration as to why the courts have found it difficult 
to define Hispanics as a suspect class drawn by racial lines is because 
of the supposed inherent racial instability of this population group.54  
Hispanics’ fluctuating racial status on the United States Census acute-
ly demonstrates what some scholars consider to be Latinos’ “racial 
indeterminacy.”55  The census first began counting Mexicans in 1930 
and made “Mexican” a separate race category.56  The Census Bureau, 
however, eliminated this category in the 1940s and instead created a 
category for “the White population of Spanish mother tongue.”57  
This new category required interviewers “to report all Mexicans as 
 
 50 Richard Delgado, Rodgrigo’s Fifteenth Chronicle:  Racial Mixture, Latino-Critical Scholarship, 
and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1181, 1190 (1997) (reviewing LOUISE ANN 
FISCH, ALL RISE:  REYNALDO G. GARZA, THE FIRST MEXICAN AMERICAN FEDERAL JUDGE 
(1996)). 
 51 Enid Trucios-Haynes, Why “Race Matters:”  LatCrit Theory and Latina/o Racial Identity, 12 LA 
RAZA L.J. 1, 8 (2000–2001) (“Racial inequality in this country is assessed through the 
prism of the Black-White paradigm and Latinas/os are rendered invisible in this con-
struct of race relations.”). 
 52 See Crook, supra note 26, at 28–29 (noting how the black-white paradigm marginalizes the 
struggles of non-black minority groups such as Latinos). 
 53 Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis:  Race Theory and Political Lawyering Practice in Post-
Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 821, 852 (1997) (quoting ANGELA HARRIS, WHAT WE 
TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT RACE (1997)). 
 54 See Crook, supra note 26, at 32 (describing the unwieldy nature of Latino identity). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Patricia Palacios Paredes, Note, Latinos and the Census:  Responding to the Race Question, 74 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 146, 151 (2005). 
 57 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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white, unless the interviewer determined [that] the person was defi-
nitely Indian or another non-white race.”58  In 1980, the census began 
asking all respondents whether they were “Of Spanish/Hispanic 
origin or descent,” and since 2000, the census has asked respondents 
to identify themselves ethnically as “Hispanic or Latino” or “Not His-
panic or Latino,” and racially as one or more of six race categories.59  
These racial categories are American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; 
Black or African American; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Is-
lander; White; or “Some Other Race.”60  Despite the Census Bureau’s 
attempts to separate Latino ethnicity from racial identity, many Lati-
nos indicate in the “Some Other Race” category that they racially 
identify as “Latino.”61 
Thus, the evolution in how the United States government classi-
fies Latinos and the dynamics of Latino self-identification make it un-
surprising that the courts have been reticent to definitively create a 
per se suspect class for the Latino “race” as it has done for African 
Americans.  The result of this “Latina/o indeterminate racial group 
identity,” as argued by Professor Enid Trucios-Haynes, has more 
broadly been that discrimination against Latinos has been ignored 
and remained unredressed.62  Accordingly, the history of both the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the census demonstrate why finding a 
definitive suspect racial classification for minority groups as a judicial 
remedy for discrimination has been a poor fit for Latinos. 
A more modern phenomenon becomes a third aggravating factor 
to the confusion about Latinos’ constitutional status under the Equal 
Protection Clause.  Persons of Mexican descent historically made up 
an enormous percentage of the Latino population,63 and thus a dis-
cussion by the courts about the status of Mexican Americans, as op-
posed to a discussion about the status of a broader Latino classifica-
tion, was sensible.64  As immigration from a broad range of countries 
 
 58 John A. Powell, A Minority-Majority Nation:  Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1395, 1408 (2002). 
 59 Crook, supra note 26, at 33. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id.; Paredes, supra note 56, at 152. 
 62 Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 33 (arguing that Latinos’ identity encourages discrimi-
nation against them). 
 63 See U.S. Hispanic Population Is Up 34% Since 1980, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1988, at A20, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/07/us/us-hispanic-population-is-up-34-since-
1980.html (stating that Mexicans make up the largest group of Hispanics in the United 
States). 
 64 See EILEEN PATTEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR, STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE FOREIGN-BORN 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010, at tbl.8 (2012), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
2012/02/21/statistical-portrait-of-the-foreign-born-population-in-the-united-states-2010 
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in Central and South America continues into the twenty-first century, 
however, the diversity within the Latino classification will continue to 
increase.  While the rates of immigration from Mexico have slightly 
decreased from a period before 1990 to after 2000, the immigration 
rates from other countries in Central America and South America 
have moderately increased.65  These dynamic immigration patterns 
quickly increase the number of naturalized and U.S.-born citizens 
considered to be Latinos who are not of Mexican descent.66  The 
Mexican American classification can no longer be considered a stand-
in for a Hispanic classification.  Case law, notably not citing to Keyes, 
that assumes Hispanics to be a cognizable class based on evidence as-
sociated almost solely with Mexican Americans is thus of weak prece-
dential value.  This case law inadequately supports a finding that La-
tinos, a group made up of citizens from nearly twenty countries, are 
truly a single suspect class. 
Examples of this questionable case law from the Supreme Court 
are Bush v. Vera67 and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.68  
In Bush, the Court “simply accepted”69 that Hispanics constituted a 
racial group, and it struck down a majority Hispanic district as uncon-
stitutional racial gerrymandering.70  In Perry, the Court treated Lati-
nos as a racial group able to assert a violation of the Voting Rights Act 
in a redistricting case.71  Crucially, however, both of these cases came 
from Texas, a state in which Mexican Americans are essentially the 
only Latino subpopulation.72  There is scant evidence in either case 
that the Supreme Court conceptualized its Hispanic classification as 
encompassing minority groups besides Mexican Americans in the 
Texas counties.  In addition, the Ninth Circuit, again not citing to 
Keyes, announced that “Hispanics have long been recognized as a ‘dis-
tinctive’ group in the community,”73 but it cited principally to Cas-
 
(noting the extraordinary size of the Mexican-American population when compared to 
the size of other Latino ethnic groups in 1988). 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at tbl.6. 
 67 517 U.S. 952 (1996). 
 68 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 69 Valle v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 478 F.3d 1326, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007) (Barkett, J., dis-
senting). 
 70 Vera, 517 U.S. at 973–95. 
 71 Perry, 548 U.S. at 427. 
 72 See PEW RESEARCH CTR., HISPANIC POPULATION IN SELECT U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS, 
2010 (2013), http://www.pewhispanic.org/hispanic-population-in-select-u-s-metropolitan-
areas (showing that the Latino population in San Antonio, Texas, for example, is over 
ninety percent Mexican). 
 73 United States v. Rodriguez-Lara, 421 F.3d 932, 941 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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taneda, a case that only considered the status of Mexican Americans.74  
Thus, while facially supporting the idea that Hispanics are conclusive-
ly a suspect class, these Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit cases show 
that such a finding is in fact still unsettled. 
D.  National Origin Classifications Are Insufficient and the Court Should 
Definitively Find Latinos to be a Suspect Class 
In 1989, the Second Circuit, despite finding that Hispanics were a 
cognizable class, admitted that “issues may arise as to whether a par-
ticular individual is properly included within the category of ‘Hispan-
ics.’”75  Now, twenty-five years later, such issues have come to the fore.  
The problematic citations to and extension of Hernandez, the theoret-
ical incongruence of the Equal Protection Clause remedies for non-
black minorities, the historical “racial flexibility” of the Latino popu-
lation, and the increasing diversity within the Latino population have 
muddled the conclusions about whether Latinos in fact constitute a 
suspect class and about who is included in this racial or ethnic classi-
fication.  While these conclusions have become increasingly ambigu-
ous, the public perception of Latinos as a unified and established mi-
nority group has dramatically increased.76  Sociologist Cristina Mora 
has researched what she calls the “institutionalization of Hispanic 
panethnicity in the United States.”77  She explains that in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the Latino communities were geographically, culturally, 
and politically disparate, but by 1990, through a congruence of vari-
ous factors, a united Hispanic identity emerged.78  Today, a “net-
worked chorus of state, market and civic organizations . . . loudly in-
sist on the real existence of the Hispanic vote, the Hispanic market 
and the Hispanic community.”79  Other scholars have also remarked 
that Latinos are consistently considered a concrete racial group in 
“public policy debates about government benefits, immigration law, 
[and] affirmative action.”80  This juxtaposition of confusing Supreme 
Court precedent about whether Latinos constitute a cognizable class 
 
 74 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 483–85 (1977) (describing how the case involved dis-
crimination against Mexican Americans in the grand jury selection process). 
 75 United States v. Alvarado, 891 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds, 497 
U.S. 543 (1990). 
 76 See G. Cristina Mora, Hispanic Panethnicity, BERKELEY REV. LATIN AM. STUD. 7 (2011–2012), 
http://clas.berkeley.edu/Publications/Review/Fall2011/pdf/BRLAS Fall2011-Mora.pdf. 
 77 Id. at 9. 
 78 Id. at 7–8. 
 79 Id. at 11. 
 80 Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 17. 
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with a clear social perception of an established minority group is 
troubling.  The Court ought to resolve this tension by clarifying its 
case law. 
Critics may argue, however, that the social perception of Latinos 
as a definite minority group is not a proper legal argument to sup-
port a finding that Latinos are a recognizable suspect class under the 
law.  Critics may further point to the fact that under current Equal 
Protection Doctrine, the classifications of various national origin 
groups (i.e., Puerto Rican Americans, Cuban Americans, etc.) that 
would likely be included in the Latino category already receive 
heightened scrutiny based on these national origin classifications.  
Thus, they argue, a new legal classification for Latinos is unnecessary.  
Even without establishing a Latino classification, it must be acknowl-
edged that courts will apply heightened scrutiny to legislation that 
explicitly creates disparate treatment for Latin American national 
origin communities.81  But it is in the context of facially race neutral 
laws, however, that the solidification and clarification of the broader 
Latino classification becomes legally important.  The Supreme Court 
announced in Washington v. Davis82 that laws that are facially neutral 
as to race and national origin receive heightened scrutiny only if 
there is proof of a discriminatory purpose.83  Proving a discriminatory 
purpose behind a facially race neutral law will become relevant for 
Latinos, particularly in cases challenging the constitutionality of re-
districting plans and the enforcement of English-only laws, as both of 
these types of legislation are considered race neutral.84 
There are two problems with proving this discriminatory purpose 
without the solidification of the Latino classification.  First, without a 
broad Latino classification, each national origin group must sue sepa-
rately to ensure the application of heightened scrutiny.  This creates 
repetitive and inefficient litigation.  Second, and more importantly, 
 
 81 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (“[A]ll legal restrictions 
which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.”); see also 
Jenny Rivera, An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin Subclassifications:  The Context 
That Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 918 (2007) (“[D]ifferential treatment based 
on . . . any national origin race surrogate that appears to act like a race marker is subject-
ed to strict scrutiny.”). 
 82 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 83 Id. at 242. 
 84 The Court has made clear that “[e]lectoral district lines are ‘facially race neutral.’”  Par-
ents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 (2007) (quoting 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Language 
classifications have also been considered “invariably facially race-neutral.”  Andrew P. 
Averbach, Language Classifications and the Equal Clause Protection Clause:  When Is Language a 
Pretext for Race or Ethnicity?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 481, 499 (1994). 
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the discrimination experienced by Latinos is not primarily based on 
being a member of a particular foreign origin group.  Professor Jenny 
Rivera has described how Latinos from various national origin groups 
experience discrimination because of their national origin and also 
because they are “perceived to be ‘Latinos.’”85  She writes,  
[A]n individual of Puerto Rican, Mexican, Cuban, Dominican, or other 
Latin American descent may experience different treatment not only be-
cause the person is part of a Latino [ethnic] population [group] within 
the United States, but also because the person’s ancestral roots are locat-
ed within Latin America or the Latino Caribbean.86 
She also explains how “those hostile to Latinos have relied on La-
tino homogenization to facilitate the construction of all Latino sub-
classification members as foreigners.”87  Further, the English-only 
movement has been described as “an expression of the underlying in-
security about and prejudice towards Hispanics,”88 and not as a 
movement against a particular national origin group.  Thus, it is a 
person’s perceived Latino identity, instead of their membership to a 
specific national origin group, that becomes particularly relevant to 
that person’s discriminatory experience.  In the context of facially 
race neutral laws, the discriminatory purpose that must be proved 
should reflect how persons falling under the “Latino label” experi-
ence discrimination as a generalized “outside” group that is not 
fragmented by national origin distinctions.  Simply, the litigated dis-
criminatory purpose should correspond to the discrimination in fact 
experienced.  For these reasons, heightened scrutiny based on na-
tional origin classifications is insufficient, and a clarification that the 
broader Latino population group constitutes a suspect class deserving 
such heightened scrutiny becomes necessary from both a social and 
legal perspective. 
Amid these arguments, it is crucial to note that the potential for 
new discriminatory legislation based on negative reactions to the 
growing Latino political presence is on the rise.89  The enormous in-
flux of cultures has led to a growing anti-immigrant sentiment, and 
nativism is emerging as a counterforce growing in reaction to an in-
 
 85 Rivera, supra note 81, at 919, 927. 
 86 Id. at 919. 
 87 Id. at 906. 
 88 Antonio J. Califa, Declaring English the Official Language:  Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293, 294 (1989). 
 89 Carmen B. Tigreros, Note, Constitutional Challenges to Official English Legislation, 12 ST. 
JOHN’S J.L. COMMENT. 295, 318 (1996) (describing how in response to changing trends, 
the majority, by passing racially biased legislation, is discriminating against immigrants). 
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creasing number of minorities asserting constitutional rights.90  The 
rise of the English-only movement is an example of the influence of 
such nativist and reactionary attitudes.91  It is fueled by prejudice 
against Hispanics and has resulted, and will continue to result, in dis-
criminatory laws against them.92  To ensure equality in this dynamic 
time, it is important to apply heightened scrutiny to such laws and 
state actions that may discriminate against Latinos.  The time is ripe 
to clarify that Latinos are in fact a cognizable suspect class. 
II.  WHY THE COURT’S CURRENT DISCOURSE ON RACE IS PROBLEMATIC 
AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW FRAMEWORK 
A.  The Court’s Understanding of Race as a Biological Concept Is Misleading 
To definitively create a Latino cognizable class, the Court must 
examine the ways in which it describes racial categories to ensure that 
a Latino classification will fit within its current suspect class jurispru-
dence.  This may consequently require the Court to understand race 
in a nuanced fashion that acknowledges the diversity and dynamics of 
the Latino population.  Presently, however, the Court embraces a lim-
ited notion of race as a fixed, biological essence.93  Several examples 
follow.  To begin, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,94 Jus-
tice Brennan wrote that “race, like gender and illegitimacy, . . . is an 
immutable characteristic which its possessors are powerless to escape 
or set aside.”95  In addition, the Court asserted in Frontiero v. Richard-
son96 that “sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable charac-
teristic determined solely by the accident of birth.”97  Justice Potter 
 
 90 Id. at 309, 318. 
 91 Id.  See Jeffrey D. Kirtner, Note, English-Only Rules and the Role of Perspective in Title VII 
Claims, 73 TEX. L. REV. 871, 897 (1995) (“[T]he English-only rule must be viewed in the 
context of an often hostile relationship between Hispanics and the dominant culture.”). 
 92 Califa, supra note 88, at 294 (explaining that the English-Only movement is an expression 
of the underlying insecurity and prejudice towards Hispanics). 
 93 Susan Kiyomi Serrano, Rethinking Race for Strict Scrutiny Purposes:  Yniguez and the Racializa-
tion of English Only, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 221, 235 (1997); see Crook, supra 26, at 20 (finding 
that the Court has moved towards a “formalistic understanding of racial identity as biolo-
gy, devoid of historical or social meaning”); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is 
Color-Blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991) (noting that the Court often uses a formalized 
conception of race that is unrelated to ability, disadvantage, or moral culpability). 
 94 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 95 Id. at 360 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Serrano, supra 
note 93, at 235 (describing examples of the Court’s reliance on immutable, biological 
race). 
 96 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 97 Id. at 686. 
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Stewart made a similar pronouncement in his dissent in Fullilove v. 
Klutznick,98 in which he wrote, “The color of a person’s skin and the 
country of his origin are immutable facts that bear no relation to abil-
ity, disadvantage, [or] moral culpability.”99 
Further, in Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji,100 the Court purport-
ed to recognize that “racial classifications are for the most part socio-
political, rather than biological, in nature,”101 but appeared unable to 
reject the concept of biological race.  Justice Byron White, writing for 
the Court, ultimately agreed with the lower court that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1981 “reaches discrimination against an individual ‘because he or 
she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinc-
tive subgrouping of homo sapiens.’”102  Lastly, in oral arguments for As-
troline Communications Co. v. Shurbey Broadcasting of Hartford, Inc.,103 Jus-
tice Antonin Scalia stated that a policy of granting minorities 
broadcasting licenses was reduced to a question of “blood, . . . blood, 
not background and environment.”104 
This conception of racial identity as a matter of biology, devoid of 
social and historical meaning, is extremely problematic for two rea-
sons.  First, as will be further discussed below, the rejection of race as 
a scientific concept by biologists and anthropologists is now nearly 
complete.105  In fact, the idea that races exist in nature has been de-
scribed as “abandoned” by science.106  Second, due to a history of col-
onization, slavery, and intermarriage, the Latino population group 
encompasses “a variety of national origins, cultures, and languages, 
not to mention racial phenotypes.”107  These historical dynamics 
 
 98 448 U.S. 448 (1980). 
 99 Id. at 525 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
100 481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
101 Id. at 610 n.4. 
102 Id. at 613 (quoting Al-Khazraji v. Saint Francis Coll., 784 F.2d 505, 517 (3d Cir. 1986)); see 
also Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race:  Some Observations on Illusion, Fabri-
cation, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16–17 (1994) (describing how the Court 
has been unwilling to sever race from biology). 
103 Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)(opinions consolidated), vacated as moot, 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
104 Oral Argument at 21:19, Astroline Commc’ns Co. v. Shurbey Broad. of Hartford, Inc., 497 
U.S. 547 (No. 89-700), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-
1989/1989/1989_89_700. 
105 See López, supra note 102, at 16; Paredes, supra note 56, at 150 (describing how most 
modern scholars agree that race is socially constructed). 
106 IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW:  THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 100 (1996).  See 
generally STEPHAN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN (1981); NANCY STEPAN, THE IDEA 
OF RACE IN SCIENCE:  GREAT BRITAIN, 1800–1960, at 170 (1982) (explaining that in the late 
1950s and 1960s, “[r]ace simply no longer occupied the centre of the scientific stage as it 
once had done”). 
107 Crook, supra note 26, at 31. 
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mean that the diverse Latino population will not fit within a narrow 
and biological conception of race.  Ultimately, if the Court continues 
to rely on its flawed conception of race, it is likely to leave the status 
of a Latino racial classification in jeopardy.  It will be unable to clarify 
that Latinos are a suspect group, like African Americans, because it 
will have difficulty conceiving the Latino group as a race as the term 
is currently understood.  As Professor Trucios-Haynes stated, Latinos 
will not be “fully protected by anti-discrimination law because they do 
fit within a narrow biological definition of race that focused [sic] on 
color and bloodlines.”108 
B.  The Court Must Understand Race to be a Social Concept 
The Court must finally accept the overwhelming scientific and an-
thropological research that shows that race is in fact a social con-
struct.109  This new understanding will align Supreme Court doctrine 
with well-settled scientific findings and will consequently better ac-
commodate a Latino racial classification for suspect class analysis.  
The Court must accept that modern science has recognized that race 
does not have a biological component and that racial classifications 
are largely arbitrary.110  Features usually “coded to race, for example, 
stature, skin color, hair texture, and facial structure, do not correlate 
strongly with genetic variation.”111  Indeed, genetic differences be-
tween individuals considered to be from the same race are often 
greater than the differences between individuals of different races.112  
Instead, races are created through social and political processes.113  
Race theorists Michael Omi and Howard Winant define race as “a 
concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests 
 
108 Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 17. 
109 See López, supra note 102, at 16 (“The rejection of race in science is now almost com-
plete.”); Paredes, supra note 56, at 150 (describing how most modern scholars agree that 
race is socially constructed). 
110 Paredes, supra note 56, at 149 (discussing the social construction and arbitrary nature of 
race). 
111 López, supra note 102, at 15. 
112 Paredes, supra note 56, at 149 (“[I]t has been found that differences between individuals 
of the same race are often greater than the differences between the ‘average’ individuals 
of different races.” (quoting Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610 n.4 
(1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
113 DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION:  HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-
CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 5 (2011) (“These racial reclassifications did 
not occur in response to scientific advances in human biology, but in response to socio-
political imperatives.”). 
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by referring to different types of human bodies.”114  Similarly, critical 
race scholar Ian Haney López writes, “Race can be understood as the 
historically contingent social systems of meaning that attach to ele-
ments of morphology and ancestry.”115 
While advocating for a shift in the conception of race may appear 
dramatic, it in fact only calls for a return to the Court’s Civil Rights 
Era sensibilities.116  As discussed above, in Hernandez, Chief Justice 
Warren examined the social stigma and exclusion of the Mexican 
American communities in Jackson County, Texas and found that 
Mexican Americans constituted a suspect class for equal protection 
purposes.117  Chief Justice Warren reviewed sociopolitical factors in-
stead of relying on a finding that Mexican Americans were biological-
ly distinct from Whites and African Americans.  Moreover, because 
judges play an important role in reflecting and shaping our society’s 
dominant understanding of race,118 judges have a societal obligation 
to align their equal protection jurisprudence with modern science.  
Scholars have remarked that it is “astounding how much our percep-
tion of race is law-oriented”119 and have noted that courts “not only 
decide disputes, they also transform particular legal controversies and 
rights claims into larger public messages.”120  The Court thus has a re-
sponsibility to analyze race in a sensible way that reflects its actual so-
cial, rather than biological, foundations.  Through this necessary rea-
lignment, the Court will consequently develop a framework that will 
better accommodate a Latino racial classification for equal protection 
purposes. 
 
114 MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 
1960S TO THE 1990S, at 55 (2d ed. 1994) (emphasis omitted). 
115 LÓPEZ, supra note 106, at 14. 
116 Crook, supra 26, at 20 (“The Court has moved away from a Civil Rights Era sensibility that 
understood racial subordination as a primary force in the ordering of U.S. society, toward 
a formalistic understanding of racial identity as biology, devoid of historical or social 
meaning.”). 
117 See Part I.B (discussing Justice Warren’s decision in Hernandez as to the subjugation of 
Latinos). 
118 See Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword:  Embracing the Tar-Baby—LatCrit Theory 
and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1591 (1997) (“Legislators and judges re-
flect society’s dominant understanding of race.”). 
119 Id. at 1588 (describing the role of the law in the perception of race). 
120 Eric K. Yamamoto et al., Courts and the Cultural Performance:  Native Hawaiians’ Uncertain 
Federal and State Law Rights to Sue, 16 U. HAW. L. REV. 1, 20–21 (1994). 
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C.  Searching for a New Framework to Take the Social Construction of Race 
into Account 
Such realignment, however, will not be easy to accomplish.  The 
race-as-biology definition appears ingrained in both modern Su-
preme Court case law and in public discourse.  Properly acknowledg-
ing the social foundations of race will not be as simple as providing a 
new definition of the word “race” each time that it is used.  The pop-
ularized conception of race as genetics remains powerful and will 
conceivably overcome efforts to merely redefine the term “race,” a 
redefinition likely to be relegated to a footnote in legal opinions. 
But attempting to remove the term because it is too often used er-
roneously is a futile pursuit as well.  Race theorists Omi and Winant 
posed the questions, “If the concept of race is so nebulous, can we 
not dispense with it?  Can we not ‘do without’ race, at least in the ‘en-
lightened’ present?”121  They concluded that “race” cannot be dis-
pensed with because “despite its uncertainties and contradictions, the 
concept of race continues to play a fundamental role in structuring 
and representing the social world.”122  Even if the biological basis for 
race is an illusion, race is not imaginary.123  In fact, regardless of how 
race is defined, it is one of the first “attributes” we notice about a per-
son when we meet them for the first time.124  Further, as evidenced by 
the way Americans classify themselves as being of a certain race on 
the U.S. census, race is also important for self-identification.125  Thus, 
to properly acknowledge the social construction of race within its 
suspect class analysis framework, the Court must resist both merely 
redefining the term and doing away with it altogether.  Accordingly, 
the Court needs a new vocabulary that both signifies a clean break 
from the race-as-biology concept and acknowledges the importance 
of race in our society. 
 
121 OMI & WINANT, supra note 114, at 55. 
122 Id. 
123 ROBERTS, supra note 113, at 5 (refuting the idea of race as an imaginary concept). 
124 See OMI & WINANT, supra note 114, at 96. 
125 See López, supra note 102, at 20 (“To cease speaking of races . . . would hinder our under-
standing of the way people think about their daily lives . . . .”). 
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III.  USING AN “OTHERIZATION” THEORY AS A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
FINDING RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS 
A.  Said’s Orientalism and How It Fits in Public and Scholarly Discourse 
The late Edward Said, through his seminal work Orientalism,126 can 
provide such a new vocabulary and framework for the Court.  Orien-
talism, as both the title and the book’s dominant theory, examines the 
ways in which the Western world perceives the Arab world, what he 
terms the Orient.127  Said explains that in conceptualizing the Middle 
East, Europe and the United States developed a clear “us” versus 
“them” schema.  He writes, “Orientalism was ultimately a political vi-
sion of reality whose structure promoted the difference between the 
familiar (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the 
East, ‘them’).”128  He notes that “[m]en have always divided the world 
up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each 
other”129 and that no cultural distinctions were made between the var-
ious Arab countries as all Arabs were conflated into a single “Orien-
tal” category.130  He remarks that this binary between the West and the 
East helped to establish political conceptions of “Western superiority 
and Oriental inferiority.”131  The “Oriental” becomes a “subject 
race”132 and “the Other” who remains a stranger and foreigner to the 
Western world of rationalism and maturity.  Simply, Said’s theory of 
orientalism describes how the “Oriental” becomes “otherized” by 
Western society. 
It is striking how well modern theories of racial formation corre-
spond with Said’s theory of orientalism.  He explains how the Arabs 
came to be considered an inferior race through social and political 
processes of creating imagined boundaries between different cul-
tures.  We can universalize this orientalism to examine the ways in 
which our American society has “otherized” various minority groups 
and found them to be a “race” by drawing clear lines between differ-
ent population groups.  For example, Professor López describes the 
racial line drawing in which white Americans engaged in the context 
 
126 SAID, supra note 13. 
127 Id. at 1. 
128 Id. at 43–44. 
129 Id. at 39. 
130 Id. at 37–38 (“One of the convenient things about Orientals for Cromer was that manag-
ing them, although circumstances might differ slightly here and there, was almost every-
where nearly the same.”). 
131 Id. at 42. 
132 Id. at 44. 
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of naturalization laws in the early nineteenth century.133  He remarks 
how “blacks [were] constructed as lazy, ignorant, lascivious, and crim-
inal . . . [while whites were constructed] as industrious, knowledgea-
ble, virtuous, and law-abiding” and how South Asians and other aliens 
were considered to be of an inferior character to whites.134  He de-
scribes how “Whites fashion an identity for themselves that is the pos-
itive mirror image of the negative identity imposed on people of col-
or”135 much in the same way that Said describes how the Western 
world constructed a negative identity for the Arab world. 
Orientalism theory and the process of “otherization” thus provide 
the courts with a crucial new vocabulary that recognizes the ways in 
which racial distinctions have been socially constructed in our society.  
It provides an intellectual tool kit from which the Court can rework 
suspect class analysis.  In determining which groups constitute a racial 
classification deserving heightened scrutiny, the Court should no 
longer ask whether a group constitutes a biological race or even 
whether a group has become racialized through social and historical 
processes.  Instead, to determine which groups constitute a racial 
classification, the Court should ask whether a group has become 
“otherized” by the dominant Anglo-American society.  By asking this 
new question, the Court will develop an analysis that properly fore-
goes a biological discussion, adequately acknowledges the social con-
struction of race, and ultimately reflects the social and political reality 
of the way that diverse Americans are perceived and racially differen-
tiated in our society.  Importantly, this new “otherization” framework 
will also make it likely that Latinos, a diverse population group often 
described as outsiders who do not speak English and who do not 
share American values,136 will be found to be a racial classification un-
der the Equal Protection Clause.  Fundamentally, this “otherization” 
framework will provide the Court with the tools with which to clarify 
and solidify the Latino racial classification. 
A recent series of articles in the New York Times137 shows how de-
spite the seeming theoretical nature of Said’s orientalism theory, 
 
133 LÓPEZ, supra note 106, at 28. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 See e.g., Trucios-Haynes, supra note 51, at 20 (describing how racism burdens the lives of 
Latinos and how racism is evident in recent public policy debates about immigration re-
form in which Latinos are racialized and are viewed as non-white in the U.S. racial caste 
system). 
137 Crossing the Line Between ‘Immigrant’ and ‘American,’ ROOM FOR DEBATE, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
15, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/11/15/how-immigrants-come-
to-be-seen-as-americans. 
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Said’s “otherization” concerns are popular in public discourse today.  
This series of articles, collectively entitled “Crossing the Line between 
‘Immigrant’ and ‘American,’” asks the question, “Why are some im-
migrants and their descendants considered simply ‘American,’ while 
others are still thought of as ‘outsiders’?”138  These articles implicitly 
acknowledge a societal organization schema of “us” versus “them,” 
especially in the context of Latino immigrant communities. 
Moreover, the late constitutional scholar John Hart Ely echoes 
Said’s schema, demonstrating that Said’s analysis is not foreign to the 
equal protection academic discourse.  Ely makes a distinction be-
tween “us-they” and “they-they” classifications made by white legisla-
tors when drafting laws.139  He argues that both of these classifications 
are typically based on stereotypes but that the danger is greater in 
“us-they” classifications that “we will overestimate the validity of the 
proposed stereotypical classification by seizing upon the positive 
myths about our own class and the negative myths about theirs.”140  
Thus, laws that draw an “us-they” distinction, particularly in the con-
text of race, in which legislators draft laws favoring their own racial 
group and disfavoring another racial group, should be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.141  Ely’s analysis echoes Said’s “us” versus “them” 
political framework.  In addition, Said’s orientalism framework re-
lieves scholars’ concerns that the Equal Protection Clause will only 
properly address discrimination against African Americans142 because 
the “otherization” framework examines the unique discriminatory 
experiences of different groups to determine whether these groups 
have in fact been “otherized.” 
Further, Professor Bruce Ackerman has recommended that the 
courts modernize the suspect class analysis rationale143 presented in 
 
138 Id. 
139 John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf:  A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 933 
n.85 (1973). 
140 Id. at 934 n.85. 
141 Id. at 933–34 n.85; see JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 159–60 (1980) (“A statutory distinction built on a comparison of the qualifica-
tions of optometrists and opticians occupies an in-between position, since neither of the 
groups being compared is one to which most of the legislators belong.  Such a law—and 
most legislative classifications are of this ‘they-they’ contour—may lack the special safe-
guard that a self-deprecating generalization seems to provide, but it also lacks the unusual 
dangers of self-serving generalization and is consequently correctly classified as constitu-
tionally unsuspicious.” (footnote omitted)). 
142 See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text. 
143 Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723–24 (1985). 
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Carolene Products,144 and Said’s framework fits well within his proposal.  
Ackerman explains that Carolene Products predicated the need of 
heightened scrutiny on the relationship between societal prejudice 
and the historic and then-existing political exclusion of minorities.145  
He describes that today, however, prejudices still persist despite the 
greater inclusiveness of our political process.146  Instead of doing away 
with the Carolene Products rationale for offering special protection to 
stigmatized racial and ethnic groups in light of their improved politi-
cal participation, he suggests that courts shift focus to one of the key 
words in the famous footnote:  “prejudice.”147  He asserts that courts 
must critically examine persistent prejudices by applying heightened 
scrutiny to laws perhaps motivated by these prejudices.148  Said’s “oth-
erization” question is an excellent mechanism for examining these 
prejudices because it analyzes the ways in which groups conceptually 
differentiate themselves from other groups.  Thus, Said’s framework 
corresponds neatly with a modernized interpretation of Carolene 
Products, a case which is key to the very development of heightened 
scrutiny for racial and ethnic groups. 
B.  Addressing Likely Critiques 
Despite the ways in which Said’s theories fit within both public 
discourse and current legal scholarship, a likely critique is that Said’s 
anthropology, sociology, and political science research is not suited 
to American judicial decision-making.  The argument is that his work 
is beyond the expertise of the Court and thus should not be included 
in legal opinions.  Returning again to Carolene Products, it is clear that 
one of the rationales for developing suspect class analysis was the ne-
cessity of safeguarding “discrete and insular minorities” for whom the 
political process offers insufficient protection.149  This rationale, how-
ever, is inherently a political science argument, and it turns out to be 
unsound.  Professor Ackerman points out that discreteness and insu-
 
144 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see Part II.A for an 
explanation of the traditional rationale. 
145 Ackerman, supra note 143, at 715 (describing how the Court decided to give special pro-
tection to those who had been deprived of their fair share of political influence). 
146 Id. at 717 (“[D]espite the existence of pervasive social prejudice, minorities can and do 
participate in large numbers within the normal political process.”). 
147 Id. at 731 (“I have meant to emphasize how heavy a burden the idea of prejudice must 
carry in the overall argument for Carolene Products.”). 
148 Id. at 741 (“Carolene’s emphasis on ‘prejudice,’ however, announces a . . . different[] con-
ception of judicial review.  Here the courts do not enter as the perfecters of pluralist de-
mocracy, but as pluralism’s ultimate critics.”). 
149 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152–53 n.4. 
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larity will normally be a source of significant bargaining advantage, 
not disadvantage, in the American political system.150  He argues that 
judges should instead “protect groups that possess the opposite char-
acteristics from the ones Carolene emphasizes—groups that are ‘anon-
ymous and diffuse’ rather than ‘discrete and insular’” because it has 
been these groups that have been “systematically disadvantaged” in 
our democracy.151  Thus, in truth, the Court has been relying on polit-
ical science theory in suspect class analysis for decades, and the in-
troduction of Said’s theories will help to ensure that the political log-
ic behind the application of heightened scrutiny to minority groups is 
in fact reliable. 
Further, the practice of deciding who falls into socially construct-
ed racial categories is not foreign to the Court.  In every naturaliza-
tion act from 1790 until 1952, Congress restricted naturalization to 
“white persons,” and the Court examined the racial construction of 
“Whiteness.”152  Essentially, the Court was operating within a clear “us” 
versus a “non-white them” schema.  It was deciding who was not to be 
considered a foreign “Other” and could therefore become natural-
ized.  From 1909 to 1923, state and federal judges ruled that people 
of Asian or mixed Asian descent did not qualify as white, but did find 
Armenians to be white in 1909.153  Perplexingly, judges qualified Syri-
ans as “white persons” in 1909, 1910, and 1915, but not in 1913 or 
1914; and Asian Indians were “white persons” in 1910, 1913, 1919, 
and 1920, but not in 1909 or 1917, or after 1923.154  When making 
classifications, the Supreme Court announced in 1923 that it would 
use “familiar observation and knowledge” instead of “speculations of 
the ethnologist.”155  The Court adopted the “understanding of the 
common man” as its interpretive principles, rejecting any role for sci-
ence in making its determinations.156  The Court thus recognized that 
race was socially constructed.157  If the Court was equipped to turn to 
popular discourse to examine who is considered “White” for naturali-
zation procedures, then the Court is equipped to use modern politi-
cal science and sociology research to decide who is considered an 
“Other” under the Equal Protection Clause.  The Court’s analysis 
 
150 Ackerman, supra note 143, at 723–24. 
151 Id. at 724. 
152 LÓPEZ, supra note 106, at 1, 19. 
153 Id. at 67. 
154 Id. 
155 Id. at 92 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
156 Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. at 9. 
Feb. 2014] THE “OTHERIZED” LATINO 859 
 
used to exclude and reject can now be powerfully used to include and 
protect. 
Another foreseeable critique of applying Said’s orientalism theory 
is that it reflects dynamic social processes that the Court disfavors.  
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., argued in Regents of the University of Califor-
nia v. Bakke,158 “[T]he mutability of a constitutional principle, based 
upon shifting political and social judgments, undermines the chances 
for consistent application of the Constitution from one generation to 
the next, a critical feature of its coherent interpretation.”159  He re-
fused to allow the level of judicial scrutiny of racial and ethnic classi-
fications to be subject to the “ebb and flow” of “political forces.”160  
But as Professor Ackerman has remarked, in a clash between outdat-
ed constitutional rhetoric and the political reality, “the constitutional 
center will not hold.”161  The Court ought to rely on evolving political 
forces, like Said’s process of “otherization,” if relying on these dynam-
ic processes leads to the most effective present-day protection of mi-
nority groups.  Said’s framework will be based on modern experienc-
es instead of outdated conceptions of race as biology.  And as Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., wrote, 
The life of the law has not been logic:  it has been experience.  The felt 
necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intui-
tions of public policy . . . have had a good deal more to do than the syllo-
gism in determining the rules by which men should be governed.162 
To follow Holmes’s advice, Said’s “otherization” framework will 
acknowledge the civil rights necessities of our time and the prevalent 
theories about how we create divisions between population groups in 
order to better shape our governing equal protection framework.  
Thus, Said’s “otherization” theory is an effective framework from 
which the Court can solidify and maintain a Latino racial classifica-
tion. 
CONCLUSION 
As Omi and Winant pronounced, “Race will always be at the cen-
ter of the American experience.”163  The goal of this Comment has 
been to highlight the particular challenges to the Court’s creation of 
 
158 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
159 Id. at 299 (Opinion of Powell, J.). 
160 Id. at 298. 
161 Ackerman, supra note 143, at 745. 
162 O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., Belknap Press 1963) 
(1881). 
163 OMI & WINANT, supra note 114, at 5. 
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a Latino racial classification and to propose a new framework for the 
Court to use in clarifying the equal protection status of the Latino 
population.  Edward Said’s orientalism theory provides a coherent 
way for the Court to examine the discrimination experienced by His-
panics and to protect the group from stigmatizing legislation.  His 
theory asks the fundamental question about whether the Latino 
group has been “otherized,” thus deserving a special racial classifica-
tion and heightened scrutiny.  The hope is that this Comment will 
contribute to the academic dialogue that, in the words of one race 
theorist, attempts to account “for the role of racism in American law 
and that works toward the elimination of racism as part of a larger 
goal of eliminating all forms of subordination.”164 
 
164 Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America:  Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a Jurisprudence for the 
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329, 1331 n.7 (1991). 
